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REVIEW ARTICLES
I) FOREIGN AID AND FOREIGN DEPENDENCE
A review and coimnentary on Aridrzej Krassowski, The Aid
Relationship: A Discussion of Aid Strategy with Examples
from the American Experience in Tunisia, ODI, 1968. 25s.
by Douglas Ashford*
Krassowski's monograph on American assistance to
Tunisia is a useful and balanced treatment of the aid
relationship, but it raises more questions than it answers.
Like most dedicated people, planners of any nationality
have an extremely difficult time observing the significance
of their own behaviour and the major strength of his work
is the suggestion that aid may well become the devil's
advocate in the developing society (p. 13). This is
a provocative and potentially highly imaginative statement
because the existence of planners and the non-existence
of an opposition are two of the most basic characteristics
of the developing country. Whether this combination
ends in an unholy alliance or a mutually productive
exchange will have major implications for the future of
the society, not to mention the planners and the indigenous
elite.
Before pursuing this thought further, it should be
noted that Krassowski's work will be useful to many who
may be going abroad to work next to American assistance
officials, and its brief outline of the choices seen by
AID, the handicaps and virtues of American organization
abroad, and the quality of its generally harmonious
relationship with the Tunisians are well set out. Because
Tunisia has been a "most favoured" nation in America's
world perspective, it is alsoL an important case to
follow for advance notice of errors and omissions that
might be couiuitted in other nations. But many of the
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fundamental questions of development and America's
strategy are skipped; why was Tunisia an attractive
recipient of massive assistance; why did Tunisian
leaders decide that massive assistance was desirable;
and are the parties to Tunisia' growth interacting in
a way that permits them to learn quickly about their
errors as well as their achievements?
The aid relationship extends all the way from the
impulses of the donor nation's population through its
political system and leaders and to the leaders and
people of the recipient country. Krassowskí recognizes
this with refreshing candor and his description of
AID-Tunisian relations as a partnership is not incorrect,
but is this relatively happy scene in Tunis and Washington
reflected more broadly in the relationship? While it
goes beyond the scope of Krassowski's book, the image of
intelligent AiD officials busily working alongside their
Tunisian counterparts leaves out the political process
which put them there. AID officials, perhaps more than
representatives of other countries, are acutely aware
of their supporting structure and much of the detailed
and exhaustive reporting described by Krassowski can be
attributed to aspects of American political life. Even
his frank recognition that assistance has broader strategic
purposes is reflected in widespread feelings in American
life that as the world's most powerful nation they are
also its target. Anyone who has talked with AID
officials will detect their ambivalence between their
professional political neutrality and their need to
justify their work to Washington.
Moving up the decision-making ladder, the distinctions
Krassowski makes about the American view of foreign aid
should be qualified with reference to the complexities
of how funds are allocated. American aid is influenced
much less by "changing fashions among development
theorists" (p. 11) than by legislative pressures and
Presidential design. Every AID official is acutely
aware that Rep. Passman and Sen. Fulbright's criticisms
of aid are followed as closely as the Ambassador's cocktail
conversation. The difficulties in getting aid funds are
roughly proportionate to the level of conflict in the
Congress, which has steadily increased with the Vietnamese
war and racial tension at home. Nor is the AID official
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immune to the jockeying for influence in the Department
of State and rivalries in the similarly paid but highly
sensitive status structure of the Foreign Service.
Many older Foreign Service Officers are still faintly
amused, if not bewildered, by discussions of a host
country's school system or peasant communities.
Within the AID mission itself all the differences
Krassowski relates in the American evaluation and
implementation of assistance are reflected in the
mission's social relationships, official and informal.
The relationship of the AID mission to the
government is naturally delicate and heavily dependent
on personal contact. Krassowski is correct in pointing
out that the level of skill on both sides has tended to
make this a mutually rewarding one in Tunisia (p. 52).
But one must go on to ask how deeply the feelings of
involvement and self-respect penetrate Tunisian
bureaucracy and political life. The very problems he
outlines in the subsequent chapter on difficulties of
finding projects and administering transactions
suggests that in the capital itself Tunisian skills were
more limited than the Gardner Report and other estimates
detected. The suggestion that both Tunisian and American
officials feel a need to be busy even if they cannot
accomplish a great deal is not meant cynically. The
pressures to deliver in a poor nation can be severe,
especially in a one-party state. The studied neutrality
of the foreign aid official is in many respects harmonious
with requirements of the Socialist Destour. Mutual
respect in a situation of confessed dependence on an
outsider is not easy. The Tunisian official, like
administrators in most developing countries, has the
good fortune of playing a role that incorporates national
service, good pay, high prestige and shelter from the
turbulence of politics.
Krassowski's account of the Tunisian plan and the
American contribution should also be read against the
backdrop of Tunisian political life, which understandably
could not be done in a short monograph. But he is almost
too kind in reporting American reactions to Tunisian
planning. Ben Salah and his aides had substantial social
vision in their Perspective Décennale, the outline for the
ten year development period. Perhaps they did not take
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the discussion of the co-operative sector, for example,
seriously, but it is even clearer that many American
of ficials and their consultants viewed this notion with
some alarm. Many of the very genial conversations about
long-term support were directed at persuading the Tunisians
to soft-pedal public housing, medical care and agrarian
reform goals. The Tunisian plan can only be understood
by assessing the internal pressures on Bourguiba to
acknowledge socialism, which dominated Socialist (then Neo)
Destourian discussion in the 50s and early 6Os. The plan
was an ingenious device to achieve this aim while simultan-
eously justifying much stronger party control and central-
ization of new activities. The issues of accountability,
standardization and efficiency are quickly converted into
political requirements to conform.
For these reasons it does' not seem unreasonable to
think of the massive assistance to Tunisia, and to other
countries, as a surrogate for meaningful opposition
activity. For the intelligent, trained Tunisian the
battle of wits with an equally bright foreigner can become
a substitute for party disputes and political activism.
In a government dominated by an extraordinarily talented,
but also politically astute, President there is safety,
perhaps even some relief, in arguing in the private
office rather than on a public platform. From this
perspective, the foreign assistance official is, to mix
metaphors, a straw devil's advocate because he fits
conveniently within the constraints layed down by the
political system. These may, in fact, be wise constraints,
at least for a time, but no-one openly raises these
problems and the energetic concentration on economic
analysis and growth helps postpone the discussion. The
symbiotic relationship conceivably can be as misleading
and debilitating as colonial dependence was a generation
ago. The Tunisian may wake up one day and find that while
busily churning away at foreign distinctions about "general
versus project" support he has succumbed to a new colonial
mentality that saps his imagination and destroys his self-
respect just as effectively as submission to foreign rule.
Even in very intimate situations in the family and
among friends, giving, is performed in a distinctly cere-
monial fashion. It is not easy to admit one's dependence
on another nor is it comfortable to accept indebtedness.
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The Tunisians and the Americans are aware of these compl-
ications as every sensitive person is, but it seems
doubtful if we have fully explored the psychological
implications of foreign assistance. Tunisia obviously
is not about to become a model of America, but will it
have an identity that the thousands of Tunisians being
mobilized by massive social change can accept? For most
of us playing with the devil is only a diversion, stimulat-
ing as it may be, but for the developing country it can
become a way of life.
